Anarchy 85/Meliorism—a reply - Revision history

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Meliorism—a reply | author = Ross Poole | section = | previous = [[../Meliorism|Meliorism]..."

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{{header
| title = [[../|ANARCHY 85 (Vol 8 No 3) MARCH 1968]]<br>Meliorism—a reply
| author = Ross Poole
| section =
| previous = [[../Meliorism|Meliorism]]
| next = [[../Utopian means they don't want to do it!|Utopian means they don{{t}} want to do it!]]
| notes =
}}

<div style="max-width:500px; margin:auto;"><font size="2"><div style="text-align:justify;">''{{p|83}}{{tab}}By {{qq|meliorism}} I understand a certain kind of social activity or behaviour{{dash}}a kind of activity which is distinguished from other kinds of activity, not so much by any quality or style of the activity itself, but by its having certain ends or aims. Meliorist activity is that activity which has as its end, or is aimed at, some social improvement. This account of what meliorism is agrees, I think, substantially with that of [[/Meliorism|Molnar{{s}}]].

{{tab}}It might, however, be queried by some libertarians. They would argue that meliorist activity has a certain style{{dash}}it involves a certain mode of behaviour, it has a certain intrinsic character. The adjectives {{qq|servile}}, {{qq|conformist}}, {{qq|devious}}, etc., spring to mind as ways that libertarians hae characterised what they take to be the intrinsic character of meliorism. However, to define meliorism as activity carried out in this manner would be to beg the question against those who claim that one can achieve worthwhile results in the social sphere without, as it were, sacrificing one{{s}} personal integrity in the process. And it does seem to be an empirical question which we should not pre-<wbr>judge whether or not meliorism is always accompanied by a certain characteristic style of behaviour. It seems best, therefore, to adopt as a starting point a general characterisation of meliorism as that activity directed towards the end of social improvement.

{{tab}}Libertarians have in the past been averse to taking part in meliorist activity; they have usually, though not always, been content to air their grievances without trying to remedy them. Molnar has argued for a substantial modification of this attitude. He has based his position on an examination and criticism of certain arguments which he takes to be used as support for the libertarian attitude, and which he claims do not in fact support that attitude.

{{tab}}I agree with Molnar to this extent: ''if'' the libertarian opposition to meliorism is based on the arguments that he considers, then that opposition is not justified. To the extent that libertarians have defended their anti-<wbr>meliorism by resorting to these considerations, then their defence has been an inadequate one. But, against this, I want to argue that the libertarian aversion to meliorism is based on considerations which Molnar ignores, and that these are crucial for an understanding of the libertarian attitude. I will further suggest that these considerations are basic to libertarianism{{dash}}basic in the sense that if one were to reject them one would cease to be a libertarian. As a consequence of this, where Molnar suggests that libertarianism and meliorism{{dash|albeit of a restrained and selective kind}}are compatible, I will argue that they are incompatible. Where Molnar asks that we reject the general {{p|84}}question {{qq|What is wrong with meliorism?}}, I think we should accept it, and try to answer it.

{{tab}}This will involve going oer some pretty familiar material. Still, it seems worth going over if just to give it a certain emphasis which might be missed. It is also necessary because it seems that it is just this familiar material that Molnar has chosen to ignore.

{{tab}}Libertarians, as we know, are anarchists, though admittedly anarchists of a rather strange breeed. Before we get into those elements in libertarian thinking which distinguish them from other anarchists, it will be as well to stress at least one element in libertarian thinking which they share with classical anarchists. This is, of course, the enormous, perhaps inordinate, stress on freedom{{dash}}freedom, that set of conditions in which human activity can be carried on unhindered, and in which individual and group interests can be expressed without barrier. Together with this is the correlative opposition to those forces and institutions which limit that freedom. Whereas other political anarchists and libertarians hae held out in the name of complete freedom, and have maintained, or tried to maintain, an uncompromising attitude towards those forces that stand in the way of that freedom.

{{tab}}It is because libertarians try to maintain this position that they are anarchists; if they ceased to hold this position they would cease to be anarchists{{dash}}they would be ratbags of a different kind. What I want to stress is that this attitude is basic to libertarianism, and because it is an ''attitude'' it is not, as such, subject to argument or proof. Libertarians just have this attitude: it is their starting point. It is not the conclusion of an argument, nor a terminus arrived at from the consideration of premises.

{{tab}}Given that libertarians qualify as anarchists because of this basic common ground, we can now point out how libertarians differ from most other anarchists, certainly from those in the classical tradition. Libertarians believe that the achievement of a society in which this ideal of freedom is realised is impossible; they believe that no amount of propaganda, education, or political struggle will bring about a society even remotely resembling the anarchist utopia. (I don{{t}} want to consider questions as to how this belief is justified. I think it is justified, though I think that the justification is not quite as straightforward a matter as libertarians have tended to believe. But this is by the way.) The point is that it is this belief that distinguishes libertarians from other anarchists, just as it is the uncompromising attitude towards freedom that distinguishes libertarians and anarchists from other political creeds.

{{tab}}Years ago, Molnar himself {{l|pointed out|http://www.takver.com/history/sydney/molnar1.htm}} (''Libertarian'' No. I (1957), p. 12) that the classical anarchists were not just utopian dreamers, but that there was another strand in their thought. On occasion, they stressed the reality of the present and actual engagement with authority, of the immediate struggle for emancipation, rather than the far distant, perhaps illusory, utopia, which they conceived to be the outcome of that struggle. It was in this mood that {{w|Bakunin|Mikhail Bakunin}} wrote: {{qq|to think of the future is criminal}}. And it is this strain in anarchist thinking which {{p|85}}is attractive to libertarians. But with an important difference. The anarchists usually thought of their activity as a means to a certain end{{dash}}the establishment of a free society. Libertarians, although they believe that that end is impossible, nevertheless continue with activity which is similar in kind to that of the anarchists ''because they see that activity as an end in itself''.

{{tab}}Libertarians are concerned with the content of their activity, i.e., its quality as such, and are not concerned with the ends that it may or may not achieve. Libertarians see certain sorts of action as expressive of their belief in freedom; being free ''is,'' in a sense, acting in a certain way. They are concerned with the activity, not for what it is hoped that it will bring about, but because they think that it is worth doing for its own sake. That is, I believe, the content, or an important part of the content, of the notion of permanent protest.

{{tab}}Of course, this does not apply, nor is it meant to apply, to all activity undertaken by libertarians. It does not, for instance, apply to that activity which is concerned ''just'' with the mundane task of living, e.g., drinking, eating, etc. But it certainly does apply to activity in the socio-<wbr>political sphere. There may well be difficulties in demarcating this area precisely, but perhaps it will be sufficient in this context to say that it is just that area in which we are being invited to participate in {{qq|restrained and selective}} meliorism.

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[[Category:Anarchist philosophy]]
[[Category:Literary criticism]]
[[Category:Protest]]
[[Category:Reformism]]
[[Category:Articles]]
[[Category:Republished from other sources]]
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−	<div style="max-width:500px; margin:auto;~~"><font size="2~~"><div style="text-align:justify;">{{p\|83}}{{tab}}By {{qq\|meliorism}} I understand a certain kind of social activity or behaviour{{dash}}a kind of activity which is distinguished from other kinds of activity, not so much by any quality or style of the activity itself, but by its having certain ends or aims. Meliorist activity is that activity which has as its end, or is aimed at, some social improvement. This account of what meliorism is agrees, I think, substantially with that of [[../Meliorism\|Molnar{{s}}]].	+	<div style="max-width:500px; margin:auto;"><div style="text-align:justify;">{{p\|83}}{{tab}}By {{qq\|meliorism}} I understand a certain kind of social activity or behaviour{{dash}}a kind of activity which is distinguished from other kinds of activity, not so much by any quality or style of the activity itself, but by its having certain ends or aims. Meliorist activity is that activity which has as its end, or is aimed at, some social improvement. This account of what meliorism is agrees, I think, substantially with that of [[../Meliorism\|Molnar{{s}}]].

	{{tab}}It might, however, be queried by some libertarians. They would argue that meliorist activity has a certain style{{dash}}it involves a certain mode of behaviour, it has a certain intrinsic character. The adjectives {{qq\|servile}}, {{qq\|conformist}}, {{qq\|devious}}, etc., spring to mind as ways that libertarians have characterised what they take to be the intrinsic character of meliorism. However, to define meliorism as activity carried out in this manner would be to beg the question against those who claim that one can achieve worthwhile results in the social sphere without, as it were, sacrificing one{{s}} personal integrity in the process. And it does seem to be an empirical question which we should not pre-<wbr>judge whether or not meliorism is always accompanied by a certain characteristic style of behaviour. It seems best, therefore, to adopt as a starting point a general characterisation of meliorism as that activity directed towards the end of social improvement.		{{tab}}It might, however, be queried by some libertarians. They would argue that meliorist activity has a certain style{{dash}}it involves a certain mode of behaviour, it has a certain intrinsic character. The adjectives {{qq\|servile}}, {{qq\|conformist}}, {{qq\|devious}}, etc., spring to mind as ways that libertarians have characterised what they take to be the intrinsic character of meliorism. However, to define meliorism as activity carried out in this manner would be to beg the question against those who claim that one can achieve worthwhile results in the social sphere without, as it were, sacrificing one{{s}} personal integrity in the process. And it does seem to be an empirical question which we should not pre-<wbr>judge whether or not meliorism is always accompanied by a certain characteristic style of behaviour. It seems best, therefore, to adopt as a starting point a general characterisation of meliorism as that activity directed towards the end of social improvement.

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 <div style="max-width:500px; margin:auto;"><font size="2"><div style="text-align:justify;">{{p|83}}{{tab}}By {{qq|melio&shy;rism}} I under&shy;stand a certain kind of social acti&shy;vity or beha&shy;viour{{dash}}a kind of acti&shy;vity which is dis&shy;tin&shy;guished from other kinds of acti&shy;vity, not so much by any quality or style of the acti&shy;vity itself, but by its having certain ends or aims. Melio&shy;rist acti&shy;vity is that acti&shy;vity which has as its end, or is aimed at, some social im&shy;prove&shy;ment. This account of what melio&shy;rism is agrees, I think, sub&shy;stan&shy;tial&shy;ly with that of [[../Meliorism|Molnar{{s}}]].

@@ Line 24: / Line 24: @@
 {{tab}}Given that liber&shy;tari&shy;ans qualify as anar&shy;chists because of this basic common ground, we can now point out how liber&shy;tari&shy;ans differ from most other anar&shy;chists, cer&shy;tain&shy;ly from those in the clas&shy;sical tradi&shy;tion. Liber&shy;tari&shy;ans believe that the a&shy;chieve&shy;ment of a society in which this ideal of freedom is rea&shy;lised is impos&shy;sible; they believe that no amount of propa&shy;ganda, edu&shy;ca&shy;tion, or poli&shy;tical strug&shy;gle will bring about a society even re&shy;mote&shy;ly resem&shy;bling the anar&shy;chist utopia. (I don{{t}} want to con&shy;si&shy;der ques&shy;tions as to how this belief is justi&shy;fied. I think it is justi&shy;fied, though I think that the justi&shy;fica&shy;tion is not quite as straight&shy;for&shy;ward a matter as liber&shy;tari&shy;ans have tended to believe. But this is by the way.) The point is that it is this belief that dis&shy;tin&shy;gui&shy;shes liber&shy;tari&shy;ans from other anar&shy;chists, just as it is the uncom&shy;promi&shy;sing atti&shy;tude towards freedom that dis&shy;tin&shy;gui&shy;shes liber&shy;tari&shy;ans and anar&shy;chists from other poli&shy;tical creeds.
-{{tab}}Years ago, Molnar himself {{l|pointed out|http://www.takver.com/history/sydney/molnar1.htm}} (''Libertarian'' No. I (1957), p. 12) that the clas&shy;sical anar&shy;chists were not just utopian dream&shy;ers, but that there was another strand in their thought. On occa&shy;sion, they stressed the reality of the present and actual en&shy;gage&shy;ment with autho&shy;rity, of the im&shy;medi&shy;ate strug&shy;gle for eman&shy;cipa&shy;tion, rather than the far distant, perhaps illu&shy;sory, utopia, which they con&shy;ceived to be the outcome of that strug&shy;gle. It was in this mood that {{w|Bakunin|Mikhail Bakunin}} wrote: {{qq|to think of the future is cri&shy;mi&shy;nal}}. And it is this strain in anar&shy;chist thin&shy;king which {{p|85}}is at&shy;trac&shy;tive to liber&shy;tari&shy;ans. But with an impor&shy;tant diffe&shy;rence. The anar&shy;chists usually thought of their acti&shy;vity as a means to a certain end{{dash}}the estab&shy;lish&shy;ment of a free society. Liber&shy;tari&shy;ans, al&shy;though they believe that that end is impos&shy;sible, never&shy;the&shy;less con&shy;tinue with acti&shy;vity which is similar in kind to that of the anar&shy;chists ''because they see that acti&shy;vity as an end in itself''.
+{{tab}}Years ago, Molnar himself {{l|pointed out|http://www.takver.com/history/sydney/molnar1.htm}} (''Libertarian'' No. I (1957), p. 12) that the clas&shy;sical anar&shy;chists were not just utopian dream&shy;ers, but that there was another strand in their thought. On occa&shy;sion, they stressed the reality of the present and actual en&shy;gage&shy;ment with autho&shy;rity, of the im&shy;medi&shy;ate strug&shy;gle for eman&shy;cipa&shy;tion, rather than the far distant, perhaps illu&shy;sory, utopia, which they con&shy;ceived to be the outcome of that strug&shy;gle. It was in this mood that {{w|Bakunin|Mikhail_Bakunin}} wrote: {{qq|to think of the future is cri&shy;mi&shy;nal}}. And it is this strain in anar&shy;chist thin&shy;king which {{p|85}}is at&shy;trac&shy;tive to liber&shy;tari&shy;ans. But with an impor&shy;tant diffe&shy;rence. The anar&shy;chists usually thought of their acti&shy;vity as a means to a certain end{{dash}}the estab&shy;lish&shy;ment of a free society. Liber&shy;tari&shy;ans, al&shy;though they believe that that end is impos&shy;sible, never&shy;the&shy;less con&shy;tinue with acti&shy;vity which is similar in kind to that of the anar&shy;chists ''because they see that acti&shy;vity as an end in itself''.
 {{tab}}Liber&shy;tari&shy;ans are con&shy;cerned with the content of their acti&shy;vity, i.e., its quality as such, and are not con&shy;cerned with the ends that it may or may not achieve. Liber&shy;tari&shy;ans see certain sorts of action as ex&shy;pres&shy;sive of their belief in freedom; being free ''is,'' in a sense, acting in a certain way. They are con&shy;cerned with the acti&shy;vity, not for what it is hoped that it will bring about, but because they think that it is worth doing for its own sake. That is, I believe, the content, or an impor&shy;tant part of the content, of the notion of perma&shy;nent protest.

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 {{tab}}Given all this, we can imme&shy;di&shy;ately see the oppo&shy;si&shy;tion or, perhaps better, the lack of contact between the melio&shy;rist and the liber&shy;ta&shy;rian. Melio&shy;rists and refor&shy;mers are con&shy;cerned with ''ends''{{dash}}their acti&shy;vity is cal&shy;cula&shy;ted to achieve certain results. For the melio&shy;rist, the style of the acti&shy;vity, the manner in which it is carried out must, to some extent, be subor&shy;di&shy;nate to the ends that he hopes to achieve by that acti&shy;vity. This is because melio&shy;rist acti&shy;vity is acti&shy;vity direc&shy;ted towards change or im&shy;prove&shy;ment, i.e., the end must govern to some, though perhaps only a limited extent, the means. If this is not the case, then the acti&shy;vity is wrongly des&shy;cribed as being melio&shy;rist. Liber&shy;tari&shy;ans, on the other hand, are con&shy;cerned with a certain kind of style of acti&shy;vity, and the conse&shy;quen&shy;ces of this acti&shy;vity are a subor&shy;di&shy;nate consi&shy;dera&shy;tion. It may be that some acti&shy;vity under&shy;taken by liber&shy;tari&shy;ans will have as a conse&shy;quence some im&shy;prove&shy;ment of the social scene; it may also be the case that its conse&shy;quence is some change that we would not regard as an im&shy;prove&shy;ment; much more likely, it will not have any impor&shy;tant conse&shy;quen&shy;ces at all. But all these consi&shy;dera&shy;tions con&shy;cer&shy;ning the out&shy;come of the acti&shy;vity will be subor&shy;di&shy;nate to ques&shy;tions con&shy;cer&shy;ning the cha&shy;rac&shy;ter of the acti&shy;vity as such. It is this dif&shy;fer&shy;ence of empha&shy;sis which sets the liber&shy;ta&shy;rian apart from the melio&shy;rist{{dash}}even the {{qq|res&shy;trained and selec&shy;tive}} melio&shy;rist.
-Molnar, in the course of his paper, consi&shy;dered and rejec&shy;ted certain views which might be held to but&shy;tress an anti-<wbr>melio&shy;rist stance. I have agreed that, as they stand, these consi&shy;dera&shy;tions do not support a general oppo&shy;si&shy;tion to melio&shy;rism. However, in the light of what I have said so far, some at least can be refor&shy;mula&shy;ted so as to appear much more plau&shy;sible, ot perhaps as argu&shy;ments in their own right, {{p|86}}but as ad&shy;juncts to the basic posi&shy;tion. For example, Molnar, in my view quite cor&shy;rect&shy;ly, rejec&shy;ted the thesis that melio&shy;rism is inef&shy;fec&shy;tive. As a uni&shy;ver&shy;sal gene&shy;rali&shy;sa&shy;tion this appears to be plainly false. But what is more plau&shy;sible, and what, perhaps, is meant by many who have made this claim, is the view that liber&shy;ta&shy;rian acti&shy;vity, if it is to be consi&shy;dered melio&shy;rist, will be seen as inef&shy;fec&shy;tive melio&shy;rism.
+{{tab}}Molnar, in the course of his paper, consi&shy;dered and rejec&shy;ted certain views which might be held to but&shy;tress an anti-<wbr>melio&shy;rist stance. I have agreed that, as they stand, these consi&shy;dera&shy;tions do not support a general oppo&shy;si&shy;tion to melio&shy;rism. However, in the light of what I have said so far, some at least can be refor&shy;mula&shy;ted so as to appear much more plau&shy;sible, ot perhaps as argu&shy;ments in their own right, {{p|86}}but as ad&shy;juncts to the basic posi&shy;tion. For example, Molnar, in my view quite cor&shy;rect&shy;ly, rejec&shy;ted the thesis that melio&shy;rism is inef&shy;fec&shy;tive. As a uni&shy;ver&shy;sal gene&shy;rali&shy;sa&shy;tion this appears to be plainly false. But what is more plau&shy;sible, and what, perhaps, is meant by many who have made this claim, is the view that liber&shy;ta&shy;rian acti&shy;vity, if it is to be consi&shy;dered melio&shy;rist, will be seen as inef&shy;fec&shy;tive melio&shy;rism.
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-<div style="max-width:500px; margin:auto;"><font size="2"><div style="text-align:justify;">''{{p|83}}{{tab}}By {{qq|melio&shy;rism}} I under&shy;stand a certain kind of social acti&shy;vity or beha&shy;viour{{dash}}a kind of acti&shy;vity which is dis&shy;tin&shy;guished from other kinds of acti&shy;vity, not so much by any quality or style of the acti&shy;vity itself, but by its having certain ends or aims. Melio&shy;rist acti&shy;vity is that acti&shy;vity which has as its end, or is aimed at, some social im&shy;prove&shy;ment. This account of what melio&shy;rism is agrees, I think, sub&shy;stan&shy;tial&shy;ly with that of [[/Meliorism|Molnar{{s}}]].
+<div style="max-width:500px; margin:auto;"><font size="2"><div style="text-align:justify;">{{p|83}}{{tab}}By {{qq|melio&shy;rism}} I under&shy;stand a certain kind of social acti&shy;vity or beha&shy;viour{{dash}}a kind of acti&shy;vity which is dis&shy;tin&shy;guished from other kinds of acti&shy;vity, not so much by any quality or style of the acti&shy;vity itself, but by its having certain ends or aims. Melio&shy;rist acti&shy;vity is that acti&shy;vity which has as its end, or is aimed at, some social im&shy;prove&shy;ment. This account of what melio&shy;rism is agrees, I think, sub&shy;stan&shy;tial&shy;ly with that of [[../Meliorism|Molnar{{s}}]].
 {{tab}}It might, however, be queried by some liber&shy;tari&shy;ans. They would argue that melio&shy;rist acti&shy;vity has a certain style{{dash}}it in&shy;volves a certain mode of beha&shy;viour, it has a certain in&shy;trin&shy;sic cha&shy;rac&shy;ter. The adjec&shy;tives {{qq|servile}}, {{qq|con&shy;for&shy;mist}}, {{qq|devious}}, etc., spring to mind as ways that liber&shy;tari&shy;ans hae cha&shy;rac&shy;ter&shy;ised what they take to be the in&shy;trin&shy;sic cha&shy;rac&shy;ter of melio&shy;rism. However, to define melio&shy;rism as acti&shy;vity carried out in this manner would be to beg the ques&shy;tion against those who claim that one can achieve worth&shy;while results in the social sphere without, as it were, sacri&shy;fi&shy;cing one{{s}} personal integ&shy;rity in the process. And it does seem to be an empi&shy;rical ques&shy;tion which we should not pre-<wbr>judge whether or not melio&shy;rism is always accom&shy;pa&shy;nied by a certain cha&shy;rac&shy;teris&shy;tic style of beha&shy;viour. It seems best, there&shy;fore, to adopt as a star&shy;ting point a general cha&shy;rac&shy;teri&shy;sa&shy;tion of melio&shy;rism as that acti&shy;vity direc&shy;ted towards the end of social im&shy;prove&shy;ment.
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 {{tab}}Of course, this does not apply, nor is it meant to apply, to all acti&shy;vity under&shy;taken by liber&shy;tari&shy;ans. It does not, for in&shy;stance, apply to that acti&shy;vity which is con&shy;cerned ''just'' with the mundane task of living, e.g., drin&shy;king, eating, etc. But it cer&shy;tain&shy;ly does apply to acti&shy;vity in the socio-<wbr>poli&shy;tical sphere. There may well be diffi&shy;cul&shy;ties in demar&shy;ca&shy;ting this area pre&shy;cise&shy;ly, but perhaps it will be suf&shy;fi&shy;cient in this context to say that it is just that area in which we are being invited to parti&shy;ci&shy;pate in {{qq|res&shy;trained and selec&shy;tive}} melio&shy;rism.

Anarchy 85/Meliorism—a reply - Revision history

imported>Ivanhoe at 20:22, 4 April 2017

imported>Ivanhoe at 02:28, 17 March 2017

96.49.48.17 at 18:06, 16 January 2017

imported>Ivanhoe at 21:07, 6 December 2016

imported>Ivanhoe at 21:07, 6 December 2016

imported>Ivanhoe at 20:39, 6 December 2016

imported>Ivanhoe: Created page with "{{header | title = ANARCHY 85 (Vol 8 No 3) MARCH 1968Meliorism—a reply | author = Ross Poole | section = | previous = [[../Meliorism|Meliorism]..."

imported>Ivanhoe: Created page with "{{header | title = ANARCHY 85 (Vol 8 No 3) MARCH 1968
Meliorism—a reply | author = Ross Poole | section = | previous = [[../Meliorism|Meliorism]..."